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THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS
AND THE JOINT CHIEFS
Military Operations to Meet Political Ends
Dan Martins

T

he role the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) played in the Cuban missile crisis offers
a significant historical lesson on the primacy of defining political objectives
over pursuing an expedient military solution. The recommendations the JCS
provided to the president were consistent with decades of military experience,
as well as doctrine designed to keep the Soviets in check through deterrence, but
President John F. Kennedy did not take those recommendations, and the crisis
was resolved by other means.
Following the Cuban missile crisis, General Thomas S. Power, the commander
of Strategic Air Command (SAC), cited SAC’s overwhelming nuclear deterrent as
the reason President Kennedy was able to achieve a diplomatic solution to the crisis.1 During the crisis, SAC stood an airborne nuclear alert, conventional forces
massed in the southeastern United States to prepare for an invasion, and the
U.S. Navy carried out a blockade. On October 19,
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Force operations. Furthermore, the military’s Operational Plans (OPLANs) 312,
314, and 316 and the initial actions the JCS took were aligned with the Kennedy administration’s Cuba policies following the Bay of Pigs invasion of April 1961. From
October 15 to 24, 1962, the JCS pressed military planning and deployments that
placed U.S. nuclear forces at their highest state of readiness during the Cold War.
President Kennedy ultimately pursued a course that was at variance with the
initial military recommendations from the JCS. Yes, nuclear and conventional
deterrence were keys to resolving the Cuban missile crisis, but it was avoiding
a confrontation that would have required Khrushchev and Kennedy to make a
full conventional or nuclear response that provided the balance that allowed the
crisis to be resolved.
Having dutifully advised the president over the course of the Cuban missile
crisis, including disagreeing as appropriate, the JCS—particularly the Air Force
and Navy chiefs—then faithfully executed the president’s direction. This offers
a narrative of the crisis that is far more nuanced than a simplistic hawks-versusdoves interpretation.
This article relies on military command histories, declassified notes and
chronologies from JCS meetings during the crisis, and declassified oral histories.
Furthermore, this analysis relies heavily on the Miller Center transcripts of the
presidential recordings. While digesting the voluminous declassified documents
presents a challenge, this article focuses on primary sources that reveal how
the JCS maintained their primary recommendation for military action against
Cuba. Lastly, my research builds on James G. Hershberg’s “Before ‘The Missiles
of October’: Did Kennedy Plan a Military Strike against Cuba?,” which deftly
examines the covert and contingency plans for a U.S. removal of Castro and the
invasion of Cuba.2 The Cuban missile crisis must be viewed as a Soviet response
to the Bay of Pigs invasion and the Kennedy administration’s continued efforts
to remove Castro. Hershberg’s article is key to understanding the normalization
of military operations and planning among military commanders with respect
to Cuba. Leading up to the Cuban missile crisis, the Joint Chiefs developed plans
and conducted exercises aimed at removing Castro from Cuba and overthrowing
the Communist government. This supports my conclusion that the JCS decision
to support air strikes was a normal response to the discovery of Soviet missiles in
Cuba and was in keeping with years of military planning.
The JCS recommendation to conduct air strikes against Cuba was aligned with
previous Kennedy administration Cuba policies, but ultimately did not take sufficiently into account the political costs of taking such unilateral action. On October 19, 1962, after four days of planning, the JCS argued forcefully to President
Kennedy in favor of air strikes against Soviet targets in Cuba. But while the JCS
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worked to implement a military solution to the crisis, the president maximized
the variables of space and time to achieve a diplomatic solution. After the JCS
had made their case for air strikes and an invasion to accomplish the removal of
the Soviet missiles, the successful implementation and execution of the blockade
demonstrate that solving any complex crisis must be guided by the sought-after
political outcome, not by which action seems expedient or decisive.
MISSILES IN CUBA AND MEETINGS IN WASHINGTON
Beginning in March 1962, covert U-2 surveillance flights tracked the Soviet
buildup in Cuba. These Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) flights eventually
observed surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites, missile-armed patrol boats, and
Soviet-built MiG-21 fighter jets.
When the CIA began flying over Cuba, SAC used a lower-echelon command—the 544th Reconnaissance Technical Group’s Research Center, under
Lieutenant Colonel Eugene F. Tighe Jr.—to study the Cuban intelligence. The
544th was able to shorten the time necessary to discover possible SAM sites, and
eventually MRBMs, because it concentrated its initial analysis efforts on locations described in CIA reports, relying on information passed on from Cuban
operatives. As director of SAC intelligence, Brigadier General Robert N. Smith
provided the SAC commander in chief (CINCSAC), General Power, the latest
assessments on Cuba.3 The 544th’s Cuba assessments were one of the many ways
SAC monitored worldwide Soviet threats to the U.S. nuclear force.
By late June 1962, “[a]ll-source intelligence”—corroborated by “refugee and
agent reports, communications intelligence, and the like—had begun to highlight certain areas as centers of unusual activity.”4 Photo interpreters at the 544th
observed ground sites prepared in Cuba that matched SA-2 missile sites in the
Soviet Union. When Tighe had served in West Germany in 1958, he had watched
the Soviets deploy similar rings of SA-2 sites at Glau, East Germany. The effect
had been to elevate the risk of reconnaissance flights, and thus to deter U.S. observation of Soviet missile deployments in East Germany.5
General Power, Brigadier General Smith, and Lieutenant Colonel Tighe
briefed their assessment of possible missile deployments in Cuba at the Pentagon, but the reception in Washington was lukewarm. The National Photographic
Interpretation Center (NPIC), the CIA, and the Air Staff discounted SAC’s
assessment.6 Not until late August did further photo intelligence reveal roads
with “the characteristic ‘star of David’ pattern associated with the SA-2.”7 Tighe’s
assessment jibed with a memo from CIA director John A. McCone to President
Kennedy that interpreted the SAM deployments as predecessors to offensive
missile deployments.8 A preponderance of evidence pointed to the presence of
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offensive weapons in Cuba, which President Kennedy publicly stated would be
intolerable for U.S. national security.9
On the afternoon of October 14, 1962, SAC and the 544th used the trackercamera film from a U-2 overflight of Cuba to confirm the presence of Soviet
MRBMs. When the JCS convened for a three-hour meeting at 2:00 PM (EST)
on Monday, October 15, 1962, the meeting content suggests that SAC relayed
its assessment of the U-2 flight photography. This put events in motion at the
Pentagon a day before NPIC director Arthur C. Lundahl briefed the president on
October 16, relying on analysis of the higher-resolution main-camera film. On
Monday evening, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) informed the Pentagon
that the October 14 U-2 flight revealed “cylindrical objects that equated to 700
or 1100 nautical mile ballistic missiles in the Pinar del Rio area west of Havana.”10
Yet despite the DIA information, the JCS did not meet until the next day, at 10:00
11
AM, Tuesday, October 16.
While mention of SAC’s assessment of the tracker film is absent from the JCS
meeting notes of October 15, the Pentagon thereafter planned and operated as if
the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba had been confirmed. Defense Secretary
Robert S. McNamara summarized as follows: “[The] President wants no military
action within the next three months, but he can’t be sure, as he does not control
events. For instance, aerial photos made available this morning show 68 boxes on
ships that are not believed to be Il-28s and cannot be identified.”12 The meeting
discussed the long lead times for the troop movements necessary to prepare an
invasion force, and McNamara cited the Suez crisis, stating, “We can’t do what the
British and French did over Suez—say we will take action, then do nothing while
a long buildup is completed. We can’t do nothing during the 18-day preparatory
period for OPLAN 314 while the enemy prepares and world pressure mounts.”13
The meeting notes are sparse for a three-hour meeting, but the JCS decided that
Commander in Chief, Continental Air Defense Command should provide a report on the air defense of the southeastern United States, along with estimates of
casualties and damage from an air strike from Cuba.
Additionally, the JCS requested that Commander in Chief, Atlantic Command
(CINCLANT) revise OPLANs 314 and 316.14 On October 15, 1962, the JCS
directed revisions to invasion plans for Cuba before NPIC had interpreted the
preliminary results of the October 14 U-2 flight.15 Thus, even before the presence
of MRBMs was confirmed, the Pentagon already had begun to address the delays
inherent in the existing military plans and to prepare revised and additional military options to respond to Soviet missiles in Cuba.16
The chiefs were decidedly hawkish on the next actions the United States
should take. At 7:30 AM on October 16, DIA director Lieutenant General Joseph
F. Carroll briefed Secretary McNamara on the ballistic missiles found near San
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss4/7
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Cristóbal.17 At the 10:00 AM meeting, the DIA briefed the Joint Chiefs that three
MRBM sites could be operational within twenty-four hours.18 The Chief of Staff
of the Army (CSA), General Earle G. Wheeler, favored a surprise air strike, followed by invasion, and the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral George
W. Anderson, concurred. General William F. McKee, the Vice Chief of Staff of
the Air Force, dissented only slightly, believing that an invasion was not necessary
on top of air strikes and a naval blockade, and the Chairman of the JCS (CJCS),
General Maxwell Taylor, agreed. The Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC),
General David M. Shoup, recommended that the United States give the Soviets
an ultimatum to remove the missiles, or the United States would eliminate them.
The meeting concluded with the JCS agreeing that the first step should be to
recommend additional intelligence flights, then “surprise attacks on missiles,
airfields, patrol torpedo [i.e., PT] boats, SAMs, and tanks; concurrently reinforce
Guantanamo, [and] prepare to initiate an invasion.”19 General Taylor took these
recommendations to the first meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (ExComm).20
At 4:30 PM on October 16, General Taylor summarized the first ExComm
meeting to the Joint Chiefs and select subordinates, including General Power
(CINCSAC); General Walter Sweeney, Commander, Tactical Air Command; and
Admiral Robert L. Dennison, CINCLANT. Taylor highlighted the perspective of
Secretary of State Dean Rusk, who viewed the Soviet move to place missiles in
Cuba as a measure to further Khrushchev’s objectives in Berlin. McNamara laid
out three courses of action: he classified political moves as useless; he weighed the
possibility of open surveillance and a blockade; and he supposed that an all-out
military action could trigger a Soviet response.21
Out of this meeting, the Joint Chiefs cautiously agreed that low-level reconnaissance flights did not recommend themselves as a course of action, since the
effort could appear to be an attack. Intent on eliminating any Soviet threat on
Cuba, the JCS decided it was not advisable to attack only the MRBM sites, leaving
Soviet aircraft, SAMs, patrol boats, and tanks untouched.22 Thus, while the JCS
were careful not to take actions, such as low-level flights, that could be mistaken
as a prelude to invasion, they agreed that any action taken should be decisive: a
large strike, against all Soviet forces.23
At the October 16 evening ExComm meeting, Taylor echoed his morning
position and took an approach in favor of gaining more intelligence, to build
time for a decision. “Our recommendation would be to get complete intelligence,
get all the photography we need, the next two or three days, no, no hurry in our
book. Then look at this target system. If it really threatens the United States,
then take it right out [with a] hard crack.”24 Taylor reiterated the stance the Joint
Chiefs had taken that morning, during the 10:00 AM meeting at the Pentagon.25
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This desire by General Taylor and the Joint Chiefs for more intelligence gave the
Pentagon additional time to refine military plans, thus delaying any immediate
decision that would reveal U.S. knowledge of the missile sites. On the basis of
McNamara’s and Taylor’s guidance, the JCS prepared to conduct the defense of
the United States and contingency air strikes against Cuba. The lead time for a
possible air strike allowed President Kennedy additional time to contemplate the
consequences of air strikes on Cuba and the possible Soviet response.
On the morning of Wednesday, October 17, President Kennedy met with West
German foreign minister Gerhard F. Schröder. They discussed recent developments in Berlin with respect to visa initiatives and Soviet intentions to restrict
movement into Allied zones by West Germans. This conversation between Kennedy and Schröder, occurring as it did early on during the Cuban missile crisis,
shows that for Kennedy the Soviet measures in Berlin were important political
considerations, to be factored into the analysis of Khrushchev’s placement of
missiles in Cuba.
The early planning meetings of McNamara and the JCS focused on surveillance and preparations for either an invasion of or an air strike against Cuba.
Absent from the JCS meeting notes are any extensive discussions of Soviet motives or expected follow-on actions by Khrushchev, other than General Taylor’s
comment that amassing a force for a large-scale invasion of Cuba would tie up
250,000 U.S. soldiers—“playing Khrushchev’s game.”26 In contrast, Kennedy’s
meeting with Schröder on October 17 illustrated that the president viewed the
placement of missiles in Cuba as a political act that held wider implications for
the Western presence in Berlin. At the October 19 ExComm meeting, the Joint
Chiefs disagreed with the president that military action against missiles in Cuba
would lead to a Soviet response in Berlin.27 Yet Kennedy continued consistently
to view the placement of missiles in Cuba as part of the Soviets’ wider Cold War
engagement with the United States.28
The Joint Chiefs reconvened at the Pentagon at 10:00 AM on October 17, 1962.
Overnight the staff had prepared sortie estimates based on McNamara’s five
courses of action for air strikes, and had forwarded these estimates to the White
House. Yet—in evidence of planning myopia—the estimates did not account for
support missions related to the air strikes, including “escort, suppression of air
defenses, and post-strike reconnaissance.” General Taylor chastised the staff,
proclaiming, “What! These figures were reported to the White House. You are
defeating yourselves with your own cleverness, gentlemen.”29 Nonetheless, the
Joint Staff had sidestepped the chairman. Whether the staff did this intentionally
or through ineptitude, the result was the same: from there the sortie estimates
subsequently climbed, increasing the projected scale of an air strike against Cuba.
Furthermore, the Joint Chiefs remained adamant that it would be pure folly to
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss4/7
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strike only the MRBM sites. The staff subsequently (on October 17) produced a
memorandum to McNamara “advocating air attack against all missile sites, all
combat aircraft, and nuclear storage, combat ships, tanks, and other appropriate
military targets in Cuba, in conjunction with a complete blockade . . . and advising that the elimination of the Castro regime would require an invasion, preferably under OPLAN 314.”30
On October 17, an internal study that examined Soviet intentions contributed
to the military leadership’s entrenchment in its position that air strikes were
necessary. The Joint Strategic Survey Council (JSSC), a planning body under the
Joint Staff, concluded that “the USSR would not resort to general war in direct
response to U.S. military action against Cuba, that the most likely Soviet reactions would be at sea, against Iran or an ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile]
‘accident’ on the Pacific Test Site, and that sharp and strong encroaching actions
at Berlin, short of direct seizure, could reasonably be expected.”31 General Taylor
debriefed the chiefs on the Wednesday morning meeting at the White House
with personnel from the State and Defense Departments—Secretary of State
Dean Rusk, Under Secretary of State George W. Ball, Ambassador at Large for
Soviet Affairs Llewellyn E. Thompson, and Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Paul H. Nitze—along with Attorney General Robert
Kennedy. General Taylor relayed State’s preference for political measures—which
would minimize damage to alliances—including perhaps a summit meeting
with Khrushchev. At the State Department meeting the feeling had been that a
blockade necessitated a wider war, and was considered as an additional step only
by those who did not feel air strikes alone were enough to eliminate the threat of
Soviet missiles in Cuba.32 By the 17th, internal memos and external meetings had
reinforced the Joint Chiefs’ views that air strikes were the primary action necessary in Cuba, and that Russian reactions to such strikes would be confined to the
periphery and incidental to main U.S. interests.
From October 16 to 19, the JCS consistently advocated for some form of air
strikes and prepared for an invasion of Cuba. On the 18th, U-2 photos revealed
MRBM sites at Guanajay, San Julian, San Cristóbal, and Santa Cruz. At the 9:00
AM JCS meeting that day, General Taylor aligned with the chiefs in support of air
strikes and an invasion. He outlined to the JCS three plans that the ExComm was
considering: “(1) maximum political effort; (2) a combination, with military effort being built around blockade, then reconnaissance; (3) no political discussion,
air strike followed by invasion.”33 The CJCS reported that the Secretary of State
had proposed a period of discussions with the United Nations, the Organization
of American States, and Khrushchev, thereafter proceeding to a blockade “and
state of war.”34 After three days of planning, General LeMay expressed frustration
at the hesitation to commit to a military solution, saying, “Are we really going
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2018
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to do anything except talk?” On the basis of the October 17 meetings, General
Taylor outlined the likely approach, suggesting that there would be a political
overture and warning, followed by a blockade, air strike, and invasion, starting
sometime the next week. The earliest date an air strike could be ready was October 21, with the optimum date being October 23, followed by an early invasion
on October 28, but optimally on October 30, 1962.35
At the October 18 meeting, Taylor directed that planning efforts should continue to examine a “total blockade, selective blockade, and the necessity for a
declaration of war.”36 This direction did not precipitate a lightbulb moment of
clarity for the Joint Chiefs, with General LeMay responding negatively to the
blockade proposal: “It would be pure disaster to try that.”37 Taylor told the JCS
that the options on the table were either an air strike against all targets, with an
invasion and blockade possibly to follow, or the aforementioned political action,
with a blockade to follow. The JCS were due to meet with the president on Friday
morning, so they codified their recommendations as follows: “(1) Notify [British
prime minister] Macmillan and possibly [West German chancellor] Adenauer,
two hours in advance. (2) Carry out a surprise attack on comprehensive targets.
(3) Reconnaissance surveillance. (4) Complete blockade. (5) Invade Cuba? CSA,
CSAF [USAF Chief of Staff], and CNO say yes; CJCS says only be prepared to do
so. (6) Realize there will be a strain upon and NATO problems about Berlin.”38
McNamara dissented from the Joint Chiefs’ belief that the Soviet deployments
affected the strategic balance of power, but the chiefs found the presence of Soviet
missiles in Cuba to be militarily unacceptable.39
“ALMOST AS BAD AS THE APPEASEMENT AT MUNICH”
On October 19, following a 9:00 AM planning session at the Pentagon, the JCS
drove to the White House for a meeting with the president in the Cabinet Room.
The CJCS laid out for the president the chiefs’ united position: that the United
States should attack the missile sites, continue surveillance to watch for other
sites, then blockade Cuba to prevent additional Soviet weapons from entering.
Taylor admitted that the JCS had not considered fully the political implications of this course of action or the “political disabilities” inherent in the JCS
recommendation.40
For the president, the entire situation was tied directly to Khrushchev’s motives in Berlin. “When we balance off that our problem is not merely Cuba but
it is also Berlin and when we recognize the importance of Berlin to Europe, and
recognize the importance of our allies to us, that’s what made this thing be a dilemma for three days. Otherwise our answer would be quite easy.” General Taylor
agreed with the president, offering that the JCS thought that if the United States
did not respond in Cuba it would hurt U.S. credibility in Berlin.41
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss4/7
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General LeMay agreed that decisive action in Cuba was necessary to ensure
U.S. credibility in Berlin, but echoed the JSSC assessment on expected Soviet
actions in Berlin if the United States should strike or invade Cuba. LeMay disagreed with the president that the Soviets would take Berlin if the United States
invaded or bombed Cuba. The Air Force general went further: “This blockade
and political action, I see leading into war. . . . This is almost as bad as the appeasement at Munich. [pause] Because if this blockade comes along, their MIGs
are going to fly. Their IL-28s are going to fly against us. And we’re just going to
gradually drift into war.” LeMay and the JCS felt that maintaining a blockade—
involving large military forces on high states of readiness—ran the risk of accident and misinterpretation, and closed off the military advantage of surprise.
LeMay concluded his long statement as follows: “I just don’t see any other solution except direct military intervention right now.”42
CNO Anderson and CSA Wheeler both agreed with LeMay’s statement. Anderson acknowledged President Kennedy’s opening statement to the meeting
regarding the president’s concern over Soviet intentions in Berlin. The CNO asserted that the United States must demonstrate resolve in Berlin in conjunction
with the attack, blockade, and invasion of Cuba: “We recognize the great difficulty of a military solution in Berlin. I think on balance, the taking [of] positive,
prompt, affirmative action in Berlin demonstrating the confidence, the ability,
the resolution of the United States on balance, I would judge it, would be to deter
the Russians from more aggressive acts in Berlin.” Anderson and Wheeler reemphasized the JSSC assessments, with Wheeler adding that “from a military point
of view, the lowest-risk course of action if we’re thinking of protecting the people
of the United States against a possible strike on us is to go ahead with a surprise
air strike, the blockade, and invasion because these series of actions progressively
will give us increasing assurance that we really have got the offensive capability
of the Cuban-Soviet cornered.”43 Wheeler’s statement of his case to the president
was effective, appealing as it did to the fact that Khrushchev had not declared
Cuba a part of the Warsaw Pact, nor had he made an announcement that the
Soviet Union was establishing a base in Cuba. On this evidence, Wheeler found
an attack prior to such an announcement to be not only a low-risk maneuver but
politically advantageous.
CMC Shoup reflected that the American people already lived under the threat
of a Soviet nuclear strike from Russia, and that adding the capability to strike
from Cuba was a Soviet move to tie the United States up in its own back yard.
“And each time you then have to take some action in Berlin, South Vietnam, Korea, you would be degrading. You’d have to degrade your capability against this
ever-increasing force in Cuba.”44
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To each of the chiefs, Kennedy agreed or disagreed openly, leading to the
infamous LeMay-versus-Kennedy exchange in which LeMay told the president,
“You’re in a pretty bad fix,” and the president responded, “You’re in there with
me . . . personally.” The president solicited the earliest date an air strike could
be conducted, and LeMay offered October 21 and 23 as the earliest and optimal
dates, respectively.45
Before the president concluded the meeting, General Wheeler asked, “Today
. . . am I clear that you are addressing yourself as to whether anything at all should
be done?” President Kennedy replied, “That’s right.” Wheeler followed up, “But
that if military action is to be taken, you agree with us.” The president replied with
an affirmative, “Yeah.”46 Thus, Kennedy agreed with the JCS that it might come
to an air strike and invasion, but he was not going to make that decision yet. That
afternoon the president remained uncommitted.
Before departing, Kennedy had a private discussion with McNamara, after
which the Secretary of Defense issued orders to the CJCS to develop fully the
planning for a blockade and continue to work on the details for an air strike.47 At
the JCS meeting on the morning of October 19, Anderson had voiced his concern
regarding the difficulties of conducting a blockade, but after the meeting with the
president the Joint Chiefs would press ahead with two planning efforts.48
After McNamara and Taylor departed, Wheeler, LeMay, and Shoup continued
their discussion. There in the Cabinet Room Shoup voiced his final dissent, and
the secret tape recorder continued to capture their conversation.
SHOUP: You, you pulled the rug right out from under him.
LEMAY: Jesus Christ. What the hell do you mean?
SHOUP: I just agree with that answer, General. I just agree with you a hundred
percent. He [President Kennedy] finally got around to the word escalation. I
heard him say escalation. That’s the only goddamn thing that’s in this whole trick.
It’s been there in Laos; it’s been in every goddamn one [of these crises]. When he
says escalation, that’s it. If somebody could keep them from doing the goddamn
thing piece-meal. That’s our problem. You go in there and friggin’ around with
the missiles. You’re screwed. You go in and frig around with anything else, you’re
screwed.
LEMAY: That’s right.
SHOUP: You’re screwed, screwed, screwed. And if some goddamn thing some
way, he could say: “Either do this son of a bitch and do it right, and quit friggin’
around.” That was my conclusion. Don’t frig around and go take the missiles
out.49
The generals agreed that the president equated Berlin with Cuba, and Wheeler
suggested that, on the basis of Kennedy’s statements, the president was leaning
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss4/7

Autumn2018Review.indb 100

10

8/6/18 8:49 AM

Martins: The Cuban Missile Crisis and the Joint Chiefs: Military Operation

101

M A RT I N S

toward political action and a blockade. But the Joint Chiefs had made their case
for the best military solution to the president, and their recommendations had
an effect. As the president departed Washington on a campaign trip, he requested
that McGeorge Bundy, the presidential assistant for national security affairs (i.e.,
the national security advisor) keep the air-strike option open despite the president’s inclination toward a blockade.50
General LeMay’s comments during the meeting with the president were
pointed. Admiral Anderson and General Wheeler were forthright in their counsel to the president. The JCS had such an effect that the president’s planning
continued in both directions. At McNamara’s direction, the Pentagon divided
into two planning teams to explore the details of the blockade and air strikes.
During the JCS meeting on Saturday, October 20, at 10:00 AM, Admiral Anderson
“protested to the SECDEF [Secretary of Defense] that this would [be] locking the
barn door after the horse had been stolen. Blockade would not accomplish the
objective, was not in the U.S. interest, would be imposed after the missiles had
been emplaced, and would bring a confrontation with the Soviet Union rather
than Cuba.”51 So Anderson still thought the blockade alone would not eliminate
the missiles in Cuba, but nonetheless he directed the Navy planning effort to
implement a blockade.
JCS meetings continued throughout Saturday, culminating with General
Taylor’s return to the Pentagon to debrief the afternoon meeting at the White
House. Announcing that “[t]his was not one of our better days,” Taylor described
how Rusk, McNamara, and Ambassador to the United Nations Adlai Stevenson
had weighed in to support a blockade, to commence twenty-four hours after the
president’s television address. The Joint Chiefs were to plan for a naval blockade against offensive weapons and “be prepared to execute an air strike against
missiles only, (1) without warning on Monday or Tuesday or (2) after 24 hours’
notice.”
Taylor recounted to the JCS in the Pentagon, “The President said to me, ‘I
know that you and your colleagues are unhappy with the decision, but I trust
that you will support me in this decision.’ I assured him that we were against the
decision but would back him completely.” In this statement Taylor appealed to
the absolute professionalism of the military in the execution of the lawful orders
of the president of the United States. Kennedy knew that by asking for Taylor’s
backing he was calling expressly on the Joint Chiefs to execute their duty-bound,
constitutional obligation or resign. Taylor, in turn, relayed this to the JCS and
put the matter to rest, effectively telling the Joint Chiefs to get in line. The chiefs
complied, although Wheeler raised a last flag of protest, stating, “I never thought
I’d live to see the day when I would want to go to war.”52
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ONLY A BLOCKADE AWAY FROM THERMONUCLEAR WAR
Over the weekend following the Friday, October 19, JCS meeting with the president, the Navy continued planning to make the quarantine a reality and the Air
Force prepared for air strikes. On Sunday morning, President Kennedy met with
Tactical Air Command’s General Sweeney to review the general’s estimate on the
likely success of any air strike. The meeting lasted from 11:30 AM to 12:30 PM.
CIA director John McCone and McNamara agreed that the number of launchers totaled approximately forty, with thirty-six sites known. General Sweeney,
with the support of General Taylor, maintained that to be effective any air strikes
against missile sites would have to include sorties against Soviet fighter jets and
bombers, pushing sortie counts for an air strike up to five hundred. Although on
Saturday Kennedy had shut down the idea of an air strike, on Sunday morning
the president reviewed the plan with General Sweeney and directed McNamara
to be ready to execute such an attack as early as Monday, October 22, if required.53
Kennedy had to keep the possibility of a direct attack on Cuba poised for execution should the blockade fail entirely. The JCS and Air Force stood ready to give
the president military options during the crisis.
Although the meeting was not archived on Kennedy’s secret tape-recording
system, the ExComm convened again on Sunday, October 21; the meeting lasted
from 2:30 PM until 4:50 PM.54 In this meeting Admiral Anderson described how
the blockade would follow “accepted international rules,” and reported that forty
Navy ships already were in position.55 Anderson further recommended that the
blockade commence twenty-four hours after the president’s scheduled speech on
October 22, 1962, to allow the Soviets time to issue instructions to their ships.
Anderson proposed that if Soviet ships or aircraft took hostile actions, the Navy
would have permission to respond. McNamara backed the CNO, stating that he
favored such rules of engagement.56 At the conclusion of the meeting the president and CNO had their famous exchange, in which President Kennedy said,
“Well, Admiral, it looks as though this is up to the Navy,” to which the CNO
responded, “The Navy will not let you down.”57
That night the Navy worked to answer the concerns regarding the blockade
(even as the president’s speech was adjusted to use the word “quarantine” instead
of “blockade”). Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell L. Gilpatric further informed the Navy that the Secretary of Defense required the drawing up of rules
of engagement regarding the blockade and Guantánamo. The CNO remained
at the Pentagon until 11:25 PM, finalizing a message to CINCLANT Admiral
Dennison, for approval by the Secretary of Defense (the Secretary of State had
approved the message previously).58 Navy personnel worked through the night,
and by 7:20 AM had produced a rules-of-engagement document that outlined
how the Navy would respond to Soviet ships approaching the blockade line.59 The
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memorandum referenced established Navy procedures and specified that compliant Soviet ships would be diverted to non-Cuban ports. Should a Soviet ship
not comply, “the blockade would be carried out with minimum use of force.”60
Late in the evening of October 22, 1962, following President Kennedy’s address
to the nation, McNamara and Anderson began the process of identifying which
ship would be the first to be stopped.61
As commencement of the blockade drew closer on October 23, 1963, in a
10:00 AM ExComm meeting President Kennedy and the ExComm held detailed
conversations on which ships were likely to be stopped first, with McNamara
identifying Kimovsk. Further, the Secretary of Defense reviewed possible alternatives by which the president could respond if SAMs shot down a U-2. The
ExComm and the president dug further into the details of the military execution
of the blockade and the surveillance flights over Cuba.62 Given the risks involved
if the blockade effort escalated and Kennedy’s interest in the details of military
procedure, McNamara’s review with the president of the delegation of authority
to respond to a SAM “shootdown” of a U-2 was understandable.
At the second ExComm meeting that day, at 6:00 PM, the ExComm members
debated how to handle Soviet ships approaching the quarantine line. Kennedy
read the quarantine proclamation aloud, going through it point by point. He
paused in his reading to voice his understanding that if a Soviet ship was hailed
it would have the option to divert to a non-Cuban port. McNamara followed up:
“The question is: Can we search a vessel which was proceeding toward Cuba,
was hailed, requested to stop, did not do so, but turned around and proceeded
to reverse direction away from Cuba. . . . I don’t believe we should undertake
such an operation.” To which President Kennedy replied, “Not right now.” McNamara again agreed with the president, “Not immediately. That’s right. So my
instruction to the Navy was: Don’t do it.” Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy
argued in favor of seizing a Soviet ship to obtain further evidence of Soviet missile shipments to Cuba, and raised the possibility of exploiting the weapons for
intelligence purposes. Secretary of State Rusk, Robert Kennedy, McNamara, and
National Security Advisor Bundy debated the merits of seizing ships suspected of
carrying offensive material. President Kennedy stopped the discussion, forestalling any decision on seizing ships, and returned the focus to editing the proclamation.63 Thus, while the Navy had established rules of engagement on the morning
of October 22, as late as the evening of October 23 the ExComm still was debating
tactical-level decisions for conducting the quarantine, while the president edited
the quarantine proclamation.
Near the end of the October 23 ExComm meeting, President Kennedy asked,
“Okay, now what do we do tomorrow morning when these eight [Soviet] vessels continue to sail on? We’re all clear about how we handle it?” JCS Chairman
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General Taylor offered, “Shoot the rudders off of them, don’t you?” McNamara added that he would like to hold off issuing more-specific instructions to
CINCLANT Admiral Dennison until the morning. The ExComm walked
through various scenarios, such as whether ships carrying nurses or baby food
would press through the quarantine. Kennedy found none of the scenarios in
which ships continued beyond the quarantine line acceptable. The president realized the difficulties and joked, “I’ll tell you, for those who considered the blockade course to be the easy way, I told them not to do it!” The president received a
loud outburst of laughter from around the room.64
Ultimately, the possibility that bothered the president was a tactical engagement in which USN sailors forcibly boarded a Soviet ship, then got killed by
machine-gun fire. The ExComm did not have an easy answer for the president,
so finally General Taylor offered, “I think we just have to say, Mr. President, [to
use] a mission type of order: to use the minimum force required to cause—” The
president stopped Taylor: “Well, except that doesn’t give them quite. . . . I think
this is the point. If he disables a ship and they’re eight hundred miles out and
they refuse to let us aboard, I don’t think we ought, he ought to feel that he has to
board that thing in order to carry out our orders.” Taylor responded, “Well, he’s
to keep the ships from going into Cuba, that’s his basic mission now.” Kennedy
drilled further down into the quarantine procedures: “I think at the beginning it
would be better if this situation happened, to let that boat lie there disabled for a
day or so, not to try and board it and have them [unclear] with machine gunning
with thirty to forty people killed on each side.”65
Whether Kennedy was thinking back to his own service in the Navy and the
life-and-death decisions a commander faced, or he simply sought to minimize
the chance that an escalation of force would spiral out of control, the effect was
the same. The ExComm and McNamara did not press the president any further
on his guidance.
McNamara briefed Kennedy on suspected submarine movements and Kennedy communicated his concern for the survivability of the carriers Enterprise
and Independence. Assured by Taylor that the Navy could track the Soviet
submarines reasonably well, the president closed the tactical discussion on the
quarantine as follows: “All right. Well, Mr. Secretary, I think I’d like to make sure
that you have reviewed these instructions that go out to the Navy, having in mind
this conversation that we’ve just had.” McNamara replied, “I have, and I will do
so again tonight, Mr. President.”66 Following the ExComm meeting, McNamara
and Gilpatric returned to the Pentagon and directed the Navy to set up a meeting
in Flag Plot to discuss the first Soviet ship intercept. The discussion on Russian
submarines must have had an effect on President Kennedy, because at 7:35 PM
the White House phoned the duty officer at the Pentagon and directed the Navy
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to “put a hold on any depth charge attacks on submarines for 48 hours.” The duty
officer later logged that McNamara phoned the President at 10:00 PM for clarification on the depth charge order, and McNamara obtained permission to use
“noise type” depth charges against Soviet submarines to cause them to surface.67
Thus, with the blockade less than a day away, the White House and Department
of Defense still were finalizing guidance to the Navy.
The different accounts of the Flag Plot meeting between CNO Admiral Anderson and Secretary of Defense McNamara are incongruent in several particulars.
The Secretary of Defense’s oral history from 1986 recounted a long tirade by
McNamara emphasizing the blockade’s political nature to Admiral Anderson.68
A more balanced investigation into the meeting (which was actually held in Intelligence Plot) depicted a calmer encounter, with the meeting focused on suspected
Soviet submarine positions and the Secretary of Defense directing Navy ships to
positions intended to force the interdiction of specific Soviet ships on October
24.69 Following the meeting in Intelligence Plot, the CNO returned to Flag Plot
and relayed McNamara’s orders to CINCLANT Admiral Dennison, determining
which Navy ships would intercept Kimovsk, Gagarin, and Poltava.70
Reviewing McNamara’s account in light of the ExComm transcripts and
recordings from October 23 reveals that, while President Kennedy asked the
Secretary of Defense to review the quarantine procedures with the Navy, McNamara missed the president’s ultimate concerns. Kennedy understood that
the Navy had to stop the Soviet vessels if they breached the quarantine line.
The CNO met with the ExComm on Sunday, October 21, and explained the
procedures, and had codified them into rules of engagement by the morning of
October 22. The president’s message—which McNamara did not convey—was
the president’s fear of escalation if the Navy had to board a Soviet ship. If all the
previous week’s planning is reduced to McNamara’s supposed statement, according to his account—“There will be no firing of any kind at that Soviet ship
without my personal authority”—it means that his direction ran counter to the
president’s intent.71 Earlier in the interview, McNamara stated, “We established
the quarantine, not particularly to stop the Soviet ships, but to convey as forcefully as possible the political message.”72 Yet despite McNamara’s recollection, the
actual concerns that the ExComm and the president explicitly expressed on the
evening of October 23 concerned the political disaster that would ensue if Soviet
ships with offensive weapons were allowed to proceed through the quarantine
line. The ExComm meeting centered on ensuring that the Navy was prepared to
stop the Soviet vessels.
While the Secretary of Defense’s oral history makes for a great “sea story,” the
presidential recordings of the ExComm meetings reveal a nuanced understanding of the difficulties the Navy could anticipate in upholding the quarantine. In
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the end, neither the Navy nor the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Anderson,
let the president down.
On October 24, at the 10:00 AM ExComm meeting, CIA director McCone received a message from the Office of Naval Intelligence that Poltava, Gagarin,
Kimovsk, Dolmatovo, Moscow Festival, and Metallurg Kursk either had stopped
or had changed direction.73 Thus, the quarantine had the desired tactical effect:
it turned around the Soviet ships inbound to Cuba.
After the initial quarantine standoff, diplomacy continued, as did the threat of
all-out war. The crisis was not resolved until Sunday, October 28, 1962, with Radio Moscow’s broadcast and Khrushchev’s letter to Kennedy agreeing to remove
the missiles from Cuba in return for the United States pledging not to invade the
Communist island.74
Sheldon M. Stern’s The Cuban Missile Crisis in American Memory: Myth versus
Reality compares secondary literature and primary-source recollections on the
Cuban missile crisis with the presidential recordings. The analysis reveals that
the participants shaped the lessons they drew from the Cuban missile crisis so as
to align themselves with the ultimate outcome: a political resolution to a Soviet
nuclear missile deployment ninety miles from the United States.
The simplistic narrative of the Cuban missile crisis painted the Joint Chiefs of
Staff in a dogmatically warmongering light. McNamara’s oral history cast Admiral Anderson as a naval officer who would have preferred to blow the Soviets out
of the water at first light. The truth is just not that simple. Both Stern’s work and
any review of the ExComm recordings reveal that nearly every member of the
ExComm shifted his views on supporting an air strike or establishing a blockade.
The only consistent member of the ExComm was President Kennedy, who sought
room to maneuver and delayed making a decision, and whose overriding concern
was avoiding a path that would lead to all-out war.
The Joint Chiefs, on the other hand, had decades of institutional knowledge
and military planning behind them when they gave President Kennedy their
recommendation for air strikes and a subsequent invasion of Cuba. Presented
with a military problem, the Department of Defense returned a military solution. Kennedy finally opted for the quarantine, keeping the air strikes as an option depending on the Soviet response to the quarantine. The Air Force placed
its bombers on alert and the Navy readied the Atlantic Fleet. The Joint Chiefs
disagreed with the president’s quarantine decision, but they executed his orders
faithfully and expertly. Furthermore, the chiefs understood that if the quarantine
failed, the military could be called on to execute the air strikes and an invasion.
Experience uniquely informs decisions, and the military experience of the Joint
Chiefs informed their decisions and actions during the Cuban missile crisis.
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Military and political leaders are forged in the organizational culture and by
the personal experiences of their careers. The JCS remained entrenched in their
initial assessment and provided a military option to end the Cuban missile crisis. Their assessment of the larger political crisis and possible Soviet reactions
to an air strike differed from President Kennedy’s. As commander in chief, the
president cast the deciding vote, after careful consideration of his subordinates’
opinions. President Kennedy weighed the resolution of conflict against the cost
of war with the Soviet Union.
The outcome of the Cuban missile crisis was that a Communist dictatorship
became entrenched in Cuba. But as politically abhorrent to the Kennedys (and
many later U.S. presidents) as Castro proved to be, after the crisis Cuba failed to
prove itself to be an existential threat to the United States. Yet until the resolution
of the missile crisis, Castro’s removal was considered.
The president always will have a military solution available, and the quarantine, by any definition, was a military operation against Soviet shipping.
Perhaps one of the many lessons of the Cuban missile crisis is that the military
is the sharpest tool of diplomacy. Yet military operations must be conducted
with clearly defined objectives, and military solutions should serve as options to
achieve those objectives—and as deterrents, to ensure the continuation of political discourse and diplomacy.
The implicit trust underlying military service, which includes the inherent
possibility of sacrifice, is that when sailors, Marines, soldiers, and airmen are
called on to defend the nation, their lives will not be treated as merely an expedient solution, without recourse to thoughtful diplomacy. “The Navy”—and
the Department of Defense—“will not let you down.” But when dealing with a
dictator—whether in Russia, North Korea, or Syria—our elected leaders must
take the long view when balancing the achievement of political objectives against
the cost of military action.
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